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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Thus, as outlined, the charterer's negligence consisted of nonfeasance, while that of both the employer and the manufacturershipper consisted of misfeasance--one an omission, the others a
commission; one passive, the others active. The conclusion, therefore, that the tortfeasor passively negligent may be indemnified by
the active tortfeasors, and the active tortfeasors may not be indemnified as between themselves, is in harmony with the settled principles of joint torts.
B. Intentional Torts
Right of Privacy
The law of torts provides protection to an individual's
person and property. The development of the law to afford
principles to protect an individual's intangible rights in his
person is evidence of the growth and flexibility of the common
law. 6 0 The right to be "let alone"'" or the right to privacy was
discussed in a legal periodical before the courts took cognizance
of the right."" In New York a common law right to privacy is not

recognized.6 3 . The only remedy in New York is conferred by a
statute which confined redress to the appropriation of some element of the plaintiff's personality for commercial use. 4 Even
thus limited, the statute has received a narrow construction from
the courts in interpreting what is a use for "advertising purposes" or 'purposes of trade. 6 a5 The use of a name or picture in
a newspaper, magazine, or newsreel in connection with an item of
news 6or
of general public interest is not a use for purposes of
6
trade.

60. E.g., some courts have recognized the intentional causing of mental disturbance as a tort. Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal. App. 2d 313, 198 P. 2d 696 (1948).
61. Coo=.EY, ToiRs 29 (2d ed. 1888).
62. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAnv. L. RTv. 193 (1890).
63. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902);
Rhodes v. Sperry Hutchinson Co., 193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1097 (1908).
64. N. Y. Civu. RIGHTs LAw §§ 50-51: "Any person whose name, portrait or
picture isused within this state for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade . . .
may sue and recover damages . . ." (Italics added)
65. Maloney v. Boy Comics, 277 App. Div. 166, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 119 (1st Dep't 1950).
see Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MIcH. L. REv. 526 (1941).
66. Sidis v. F-R Publication Corp., 113 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Humiston v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. Supp. 752 (1st Dep't 1919);
Coyler v. Fox Publishing Co., 162 App.Div. 297, 146 N. Y. Supp. 999 (2d Dep't 1914) ;
Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 295 N. Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937). But the
right of privacy was held violated where an individual not in public life
was unduly
singled out in a newsreel, Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, 235 App. Div. 570, 257 N. Y.
Supp. 800 (1st Dept 1932), affd, 261 N. Y. 504, 185 N. E. 713 (1933), and a public
figure's news value was used for purely commercialization in Redmond v. Columbia
Pictures Corp., 277 N. Y. 707, 14 N. E. 2d 636 (1938),; Franklin v. Columbia Pictures
Corp., 246 App. Div.35, 284 N. Y. Supp. 96 (1st Dept 1935), affd, 271 N. Y 554, 2
N. E. 2d 691 (1936). See 1 BrwF.L.Ray. 174 (1951).

THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1951 TERM
The New York Court of Appeals interpreted CivIL RiGHTS
§§50, 51 as applied to television in Gautier v. Pro-Football,
Inc.Y Plaintiff performed his animal act between halves at a professional football game pursuant to a contract with defendant
which expressly provided that plaintiff's act would not be televised. Nevertheless, the performance was televised without
plaintiff's permission. The Court found that there had been advertising before and after plaintiff's act was televised. This was
held not to be a use of plaintiff's personality for "advertising
purposes" as there was no connection between the "commercials"
and the use of plaintiff's name or picture. Also there was no use
for "purposes of trade"; plaintiff was a public personage voluntarily participating in a public event. "While not a part of the
game proper, he did become part of the spectacle as a whole by
appearing between halves, and voluntarily occupying the very
center of attraction for several minutes." ' The Court held (5-2)
for defendant; thus plaintiff's right to privacy was limited when
his performance became newsworthy as a public event.
LAw

Judge Desmond based his concurring opinion on the absence
of a disturbance of plaintiff's privacy: "His grievance here is
not the invasion of privacy-privacy is the one thing he did not
want, or need, in his occupation."" There is much to be said for
the proposition that those interests for which the right of privacy
was developed were not interfered with here; there was not an
encroachment upon plaintiff's right to be left alone; his complaint
was that he was not paid for the televising of his show.
A liberal construction of the statute, however, would afford
a remedy to plaintiff.0 Plaintiff was performing publicly, but had
not consented to the wider publication of his act via television. If
the injury is characterized as an unprivileged telecasting, then
plaintiff did suffer an invasion of his right of privacy.7 1 Television with its possibility for immediate projection of the subject
67. 304 N. Y. 354, 107 N. E. 2d 485 (1952).
68. Gautier v. Pro-Football,Inc., 304 N. Y. 354, 360, 107 N. E. 485, 489 (1952).
69. 304 N. Y. at-361, 107 N. E. 2d at 489.'
70. Cvm lRiGTS LAw § 50 contains penal sanctions, another reason for the
court's limiting its application.

See Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51, 55, 103 N. E.

1108, 1109 (1913).
71. The courts have allowed recovery on a damage to property theory for an unprivileged publishing in Gee v. Pritchard,2 Swans. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818)
(letters) ; InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press,248 U. S. 215 (1918) (news) ;
Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W. D. Pa. 1938)
(baseball game). For a discussion of the measure of damages when plaintiff is only
nominally injured but defendant has benefited by his own tortious act, see Edward v.
Lee's Adm'r, 265 Ky. 418, 96 S. V. 2d 1028 (1936).
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televised to a large visual audience presents a situation unknown

to the draftsmen of the Civm

RIGHTs LAw.

But the injury is still

there, and the New York Court of Appeals should have interpreted the statute consistently with today's means of reproducing
an individual's portrait.
Libel
A suit for libel produces a conflict of interests; plaintiff's
right to have his reputation free from invasion and defendant's
right to freedom of speech and press. Where a newspaper reports
a judicial proceeding. although in a defamatory way, it is privlleged from suit for libel.72 The private right of the individual
must be subordinated to the public interest in free dissemination
of news73 and "the security which publicity gives for the proper
administration of justice.' '7 However, if the judicial proceeding-,
are not open to the public, but are private, the reason for the
ceases, and so it was held last term in Danziger v. Hearst
privilege
75
Corp
In that case an affidavit in support of a motion for alimony by
the wife of the plaintiff was published by defendant newspaper.
The affidavit falsely accused plaintiff of assaulting and phvsically
torturing his wife. Such an affidavit in a matrimonial action was
not available for public inspection; moreover, it was barred from
examination by anyone other than the parties to the proceeding.
The Court of Appeals sustained plaintiff's motion to dismiss the
defense of privilege as insufficient in law.

New York CIvIr, PRACTICE ACT §337 gives to the one who reports a judicial proceeding a privilege from suit for libel. 7 The
privilege extends not only to reports of the proceedings had in
open court but also to pa-pers filed in the course of the action, if
these papers are accessible to public perusal."8 CIvm PRACTIcE,
72. Lee v. Breooklyn Union Co., 209 N.'Y. 245, 103 N. E. 155 (1913).
73. Stevenson v. News Syndicate, 276 App. Div. 614, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 751 (1950),
aff'd on other grounds, 302 N Y. 81, 96 N. E. 2d 187 (1951).
74. Holmes, J., in Crowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884).
75. 304 N. Y. 244, 107 N. E. 2d 62 (1952).
76. RULE OF CIvI. PRAcricE 278: An officer of a court with whom the proceedings in an action to annul a marijage or for a divorce or separation are filed . . .
shall not permit a copy of any of the pleadings or testimony, or any examination or
perusal thereof, to be taken by any other person than a party . . ."
77. C. P. A. § 337: "A civil action cannot be maintained against any person, firm or
corporation, for the publication of a fair and true report of any judicial, legislative or
other public and official proceedings . . ."
78. Campbell v. New York Evening Post, 245 N. Y. 320, 157 N. E. 153 (1927).
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